Fracking and the Public Trust Doctrine:
This Land Is Their Land, But After
Robinson, Might This Land Really
Be Our Land?
By ALEXANDER BUKAC*

Introduction

CURRENTLY, FEDERAL LAW in the United States affords citizens

virtually no protections from the very real and catastrophic ramifications of hydraulic fracturing (fracking).1 Although fracking presents a
lucrative industry, especially appealing to economically depressed rust
belt states,2 the potential risks cannot be left unattended. A December
2013 Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision, Robinson Township v. Commonwealth,3 marked a pivotal moment in the fight to ensure responsible, sustainable development. The court, finding a state law that
prohibited localities from banning fracking unconstitutional,
grounded its decision in an amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution that codified the public trust doctrine.4 Abroad, a number of
countries have already recognized the need to equip citizens with sub* Alexander Bukac, J.D. Candidate, University of San Francisco School of Law
(2015); Politics, B.A., Occidental College (2011). The author thanks Patrick Tuck and the
U.S.F. Law Review, Professor Shalanda Baker, and his parents, Jan and Jim Bukac.
1. See infra Part I.B.1; see also Hydraulic Fracturing: The Process, FRACFOCUS (July 20,
2010), http://fracfocus.org/hydraulic-fracturing-how-it-works/hydraulic-fracturing-process
(detailing how fracking is an increasingly popular method for harvesting subterranean natural gas reserves, whereby fluid, containing water, proppants, and chemicals, is injected
into ground wells under high pressure, creating fissures in subterranean rock formations,
creating a more free flow of natural gas).
2. Nelson D. Schwartz, Boom in Energy Spurs Industry in the Rust Belt, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/09/business/an-energy-boom-lifts-the-heartland.html (exploring the role natural gas has played in Ohio’s economic resurgence).
3. 83 A.3d 901 (2013).
4. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (“The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to
the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment.
Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the common property of all the people, including generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.”).
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stantive protections from dangerous development practices and enshrined the public trust doctrine in their national constitutions. This
Note argues that the public trust doctrine, exemplified in Robinson,
offers a clear path toward sustainable development on a global scale.
Part I will provide background on fracking, its potential risks, and
the current regulatory scheme. Part II will discuss the evolution of the
public trust doctrine and its international proliferation. Part III will
identify Pennsylvania’s constitutional incorporation and application
of the public trust doctrine in Robinson. Part IV will briefly outline why
that approach is both desirable and transferrable on a national and
international scale.

I.

Background

The International Energy Agency estimates that, if expansion of
gas supply resources continues, global demand for natural gas could
increase fifty percent by 2035.5 During this time, natural gas production is expected to triple, giving it more than a twenty-five percent
share of the overall global energy market and making it the world’s
second largest energy source after oil.6 With recently discovered gas
reservoirs in Brazil and Argentina expected to increase Central and
South American production and demand, natural gas could occupy as
much as thirty percent of the region’s total energy matrix by 2030.7
Additionally, substantial reserves in Mexico,8 Canada,9 China,10 and
across Europe11 make natural gas extraction inevitable and the need
for sustainable production evident.
The United States Energy Information Administration projects
that natural gas production could increase by nearly thirty percent
and that shale production will account for almost half of all American
natural gas by 2035.12 Natural gas deposits exist in subterranean shale
5. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, GOLDEN RULES FOR A GOLDEN AGE OF GAS: WORLD ENERGY
OUTLOOK SPECIAL REPORT ON UNCONVENTIONAL GAS 10 (Robert Priddle ed., 2012).
6. Id. at 10–11.
7. Marcos Veiga, Latin America’s Growing Economy Presents Opportunities in Oil, Gas, Petrochemicals, UOP, http://www.uop.com/latin-americas-growing-economy-presents-opportu
nities-oil-gas-petrochemicals (last visited Feb. 20, 2015).
8. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 5, at 111.
9. Id. at 108.
10. Id. at 115.
11. Id. at 120.
12. Rachel A. Kitze, Moving Past Preemption: Enhancing the Power of Local Governments
Over Hydraulic Fracturing, 98 MINN. L. REV. 385, 388–89 (2013) (citing Mason Inman, Estimates Clash for How Much Natural Gas in the United States, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Feb. 29, 2012),
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2012/03/120301-natural-gas-reserves-
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rock formations across the United States, including the Barnett Shale
in Texas; the Fayetteville Shale in Arkansas; the Woodford Shale in
Oklahoma; the Haynesville Shale in Arkansas, Texas, and Louisiana;
and the Bakken Shale in North Dakota.13 The largest, however, is the
Marcellus Shale, spanning West Virginia, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and
New York,14 and providing these economically-depressed rust belt
states with the potential for economic prosperity.15 Natural gas production has arrived.
A. The Fracking Problem
Natural gas is typically highly dispersed in rock formations underground, rather than occurring in a concentrated location.16 Hydraulic
fracturing has emerged as a cost-effective technique to recover natural
gas. The process creates fractures in the rock formations that are intended to stimulate gas flow and produce a larger and more cost-effective yield.17 First, wells are drilled vertically to penetrate the shale
formation, hundreds or thousands of feet below the surface, and then
sometimes extended thousands of feet horizontally.18 To facilitate fissures in the rock, hydraulic fluids—typically consisting of water, proppants,19 and chemical additives—are injected into the well at high
pressures.20 The internal pressure of the rock formation then forces
the fracturing fluid back to the surface, bringing with it brines, metals,
radionuclides, hydrocarbons, and, hopefully, the coveted natural
united-states; U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012 92 (June 2012),
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(2012).pdf.
13. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, MODERN SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: A
PRIMER 16–24 (2009) (providing an overview of each shale formation).
14. Id. at 21.
15. Kitze, supra note 12, at 389–90 (citing Shaun A. Goho, Municipalities and Hydraulic
Fracturing: Trends in State Preemption, 64 PLAN. & ENVTL. L. 3, 3 (July 2012). See also
America’s Energy: Economy, ENERGYFROMSHALE.ORG, http://www.energyfromshale.org/ameri
cas-energy/economy (last visited Apr. 12, 2015).
16. The Process of Hydraulic Fracturing, EPA, http://www2.epa.gov/hydraulicfracturing
/process-hydraulic-fracturing (last updated Aug. 11, 2014).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Proppants are granular material, often sand or ceramic beads, which are transported with the fracking fluid that fills the fracture and “props” it open once the highpressure pumping stops, creating a permeable channel through which the natural gas can
freely flow. See CARDNO ENTRIX, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING STUDY: PXP INGLEWOOD OIL
FIELD 8 (Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.eenews.net/assets/2012/10/11/document_ew_01
.pdf; Proppants and Fracking Fluids, SAVE THE WATER (June 5, 2012), http://savethewater
.org/proppants-fracking-fluids (discussing proppant materials, additives, and use).
20. The Process of Hydraulic Fracturing, supra note 16.
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gas.21 The fracturing fluid is then injected underground for disposal,
treated and reused, or processed by a treatment facility and discharged into surface waters.22 The process carries with it significant
environmental and public safety concerns.
1. Environmental Concerns
EarthJustice, a non-profit organization whose mission is to ensure
all people have a right to a healthy environment, maintains that fracking fluid “is laced with toxic chemicals that have not been fully tested
or disclosed to the public.”23 According to the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, current fracking fluid can include
up to 435 different ingredients containing 344 different chemicals.24
It is common for a single well to inject more than a million gallons of
fluid into the earth during the fracturing phase.25 As this fluid returns
to the surface, it is filtered through an ethylene glycol solution that
separates the natural gas from the water and fracking fluid.26 This
contaminated water is then stored in evaporation pits to be covered
with top soil27 or sent to public wastewater treatment plants ill-suited
to adequately filter it.28 The result is that pits of potentially dangerous
chemical residue are permitted to evaporate or simply covered and
forgotten,29 and millions of gallons of partially treated water reenter
the watershed—the impacts of which remain uncertain.30
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Fact Sheet: On Fracking, EARTHJUSTICE, http://earthjustice.org/features/campaigns/fact-sheet-on-fracking (last visited Feb. 19, 2014).
24. Human Health Risks, SWARTHMORE C. ENVTL. STUD. CAPSTONE, http://www
.swarthmore.edu/environmental-studies-capstone/human-health-risks (last visited Mar. 8,
2015).
25. Theo Colborn et al., Natural Gas Operations from a Public Health Perspective, 17 HUM.
& ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT: AN INT’L J. 1039, 1040 (2011), available at http://cce.cor
nell.edu/EnergyClimateChange/NaturalGasDev/Documents/PDFs/fracking%20chemi
cals%20from%20a%20public%20health%20perspective.pdf.
26. Id. at 1041.
27. Id.
28. Human Health Risks, supra note 24.
29. David Martin Davies, More Fracking Produces More Open Waste Pits, MARKETPLACE
(Oct. 14, 2014), http://www.marketplace.org/topics/sustainability/more-fracking-produces-more-open-waste-pits (recounting a landowner’s health and safety concerns with the
pit disposal method and noting the troubling dearth of state and federal oversight).
30. Human Health Risks, supra note 24 (hypothesizing that the millions of gallons of
chemicals released into rivers and streams could, if left unchecked, permanently damage
important drinking water reservoirs across the country).
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2. Public Safety Concerns
Although the companies’ fluid recipes are proprietary, the ingredients are not. Of the 344 chemicals, many of which offer no safety
information, seventy-five percent are known to cause skin, eye, or sensory irritation; forty to fifty percent could affect the brain and nervous
system, the immune and cardiovascular systems, and the kidneys;
thirty-seven percent could affect the endocrine system; and twenty-five
percent can cause reproductive, mutagenic, or cancerous complications.31 Gas drilling requires constant use of diesel-fueled equipment,
both for the operation of machinery and transportation of products.32
The result of this overuse, termed “gas field ozone,” “has created a
previously unrecognized air pollution problem in rural areas, similar
to that found in large urban areas, and can spread up to 200 miles
beyond the immediate region where gas is being produced.”33 This
ozone causes irreversible damage to the lungs, leading to asthma and
chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases and has a similarly devastating
effect on flora, including conifers, aspen, and forage.34 A Pennsylvania
homeowner’s experience in a previously rural, non-industrialized area
of Southwestern Pennsylvania is illuminating.35
During the initial well construction process, daily and continuous
truck traffic caused structural damage to her home, road collapse,
large amounts of dust, deterioration in air quality, and significant
noise pollution.36 After fracking operations began, the family’s well
water, which had served the home for the past century, deteriorated
significantly and “‘began to stink like rotten eggs and garbage with a
sulfur chemical smell.’”37 The air, too, began “‘to smell of rotten eggs,
sulfur, and chemicals,’” infiltrating the home and seeping into the
31. Colborn et al., supra note 25, at 1039; see also Chemicals in Natural Gas Operations:
Introduction, THE ENDOCRINE DISRUPTION EXCHANGE, http://endocrinedisruption.org/
chemicals-in-natural-gas-operations/introduction (last visited Mar. 6, 2014) (breaking
down and analyzing specific chemicals used in drilling procedures).
32. Hydrofracking, CITIZENS CAMPAIGN FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, http://www.citizenscam
paign.org/campaigns/hydro-fracking.asp (last updated Aug. 14, 2014).
33. Colborn et al., supra note 25, at 1042.
34. Id.
35. See also Keith Bradsher, China Takes On Big Risks in Its Push for Shale Gas, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/12/business/international/chinatakes-on-big-risks-in-its-push-for-shale-gas.html (discussing recent explosion at rural fracking site in Jiaoshizen, China, and the threats that fracking poses to workplace safety, public
health, and the environment).
36. Robinson Twp. v. Pennsylvania, 83 A.3d 901, 937 (Pa. 2013).
37. Id.
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family’s possessions.38 Several pets died as a result of exposure to contaminated water, and the homeowner and her children suffered from
“severe health problems such as constant and debilitating headaches,
nosebleeds, nausea, difficulty and shortness of breath, skin rashes and
lesions, bone and muscle pain, inability to concentrate, and severe
fatigue.”39 Despite renunciation of the risks and repudiation of responsibility from the gas industry, the human and environmental consequences of fracking are enduring and disastrous.40
B. Limited Regulatory Power
Energy independence has become a political talking point.41 In
light of political and economic instability abroad, focus on foreign energy dependence is magnified, and fracking, as a potential path toward energy independence, has become a hot-button issue.42 Not
wanting to dampen the prospective economic benefits or make political headlines, the federal government has trod lightly—seemingly
aiming to appease the fracking industry. At the federal level, no comprehensive regulations govern fracking.43
1. No Federal Pronouncement
Although at least ten federal acts conceivably touch fracking activities, regulation is vague, and enforcement is virtually non-existent.44
38. Id. at 938.
39. Id.
40. See Mose Buchele, Texas Family’s Nuisance Complaint Seen As Win Against Fracking,
NPR (May 2, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/05/02/308796539/texas-familys-nuisancecomplaint-seen-as-win-against-fracking (discussing a landmark victory for fracking opponents where a Texas jury awarded a family nearly three million dollars after fracking operations caused the family serious health complications including rashes, dizziness,
nosebleeds, and stomach and respiratory issues).
41. See Advancing American Energy, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
energy/securing-american-energy (last visited Feb. 20, 2015) (“President Obama’s All-ofthe-Above Energy Strategy is making America more energy independent and supporting
jobs. . . . Our all-of-the-above strategy aims to harness American innovation and develop a
diverse portfolio of American-made energy.”); see also Republican Platform, America’s Natural
Resources, GOP, http://gop.com/platform/americas-natural-resources/ (last visited Mar.
10, 2015) (“Republicans advocate an all-of-the-above diversified approach, taking advantage of all of our American God-given resources. That is the best way to advance North
American energy independence.”).
42. See Chris Boling, Note, Hydraulic Fracturing and Chemical Disclosure: What You Do Not
Know Could Hurt You!, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 257, 259 (2012).
43. David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of Energy Production, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 447 (2013).
44. See generally ADAM VANN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43152, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING: SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 34 (2014) (discussing implications of Safe Drinking Water
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The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) directs the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate the underground injection of
fluids to protect underground sources of water.45 Confusion among
the states and the federal courts as to whether fracking procedures
were to be regulated led to an explicit congressional pronouncement.46 The Energy Policy Act of 2005 amended the SDWA and
makes clear that regulation excludes “the underground injection of
fluids or propping agents (other than diesel fuels) pursuant to hydraulic fracturing operations related to oil, gas, or geothermal production activities.”47
Although the Clean Water Act’s prohibition against the “discharge of any pollutant” into navigable waterways,48 the Clean Air
Act’s “reduced emissions completions” requirement,49 and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act’s (CERCLA) “hazardous substance” liability50 do apply to fracking,
their efficacy is limited by opaque industry practices.51 Manufacturers
and industry representatives remain reluctant to disclose information
about the chemicals used in their fracking cocktails, maintaining the
recipes are proprietary and constitute valuable trade secrets.52 Although the public cannot adequately inform itself of the hazards, nor
can the government effectively enforce federal law without that information, public outcry from citizens, environmental groups, and politicians has not generated a solution. In 2013, two bills53 were
introduced into both the House and Senate, proposing amendments
Act (SDWA), Energy Policy Act, Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act, Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act, Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA), National Environmental Policy Act, Toxic Substances Control Act, Occupational Safety and Health Act, Emergency Planning, and Community Right-to-Know Act on
fracking).
45. Id. at 1.
46. See, e.g., Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A., 118 F.3d 1467 (11th
Cir. 1997) (challenging whether hydraulic fracturing procedures fell within the SDWA’s
definition of “underground injection”).
47. VANN ET AL., supra note 44, at 5–6.
48. Id. at 7.
49. Id. at 8.
50. Id. at 13.
51. See Kate Galbraith, Seeking Disclosure on Fracking, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2012), http:/
/www.nytimes.com/2012/05/31/business/energy-environment/seeking-disclosure-onfracking.html (highlighting lack of national regulations relating to disclosure of drilling
fluid ingredients, and detailing disparate state reporting schemes and trade secret
exceptions).
52. VANN ET AL., supra note 44, at 19.
53. H.R. 1921, 113th Cong. (2013); Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act, S. 1135, 113th Cong. (2013).
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to the SDWA that would remove the fracking exception and mandate
the disclosure of chemical ingredients.54 Both bills died at the committee stage without debate or a formal vote.55 In the absence of
meaningful federal assistance, states and municipalities have assumed
primary regulatory responsibility.
2. State Approaches
Regulation of natural gas production creates a complex interplay
between state and local governments. Regulation “implicates the
state’s interest in safe and efficient development of its natural resources and the local government’s interest in regulating land uses to
protect the public from harm to property values, health, and the environment.”56 When both state and local concerns are implicated, however, the states ordinarily maintain dominion.57 The extent—and
constitutionality—of that authority remains unclear.
a. Zoning
Local governments have broad power to protect public health
and welfare.58 Some local governments have used zoning and land use
ordinances as a method of prohibiting fracking altogether, either temporarily or permanently.59 Most often, however, this power is exercised through land use ordinances that regulate the manner in which
land can be used and the extent of permissible damage.60 Local governments, given their proximity to the populous and acute awareness
of localized concerns, might seem the most appropriate genesis for
fracking regulation,61 but the practical reach of those ordinances can
be quite limited. Because any local ordinance attempting to prohibit
54. VANN ET AL., supra note 44, at 31.
55. H.R. 1921 (113th): Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act of 2013,
GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr1921 (last visited Mar. 6,
2014); S. 1135 (113th): FRAC Act, GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/
113/s1135 (last visited Mar. 6, 2014).
56. VANN ET AL., supra note 44, at 26.
57. Id. at 26–27.
58. Jonas Armstrong, What the Frack Can We Do? Suggestions for Local Regulation of Hydraulic Fracturing in New Mexico, 53 NAT. RESOURCES J. 357, 364 (2013).
59. See Local Actions Against Fracking, FOOD & WATER WATCH, http://www.foodand
waterwatch.org/water/fracking/fracking-action-center/local-action-documents (last visited Mar. 6, 2014) (listing municipalities that have prohibited fracking).
60. Armstrong, supra note 58, at 364.
61. See Annie Decker, Preemption Conflation: Dividing the Local from the State in Congressional Decision Making, 30 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 321, 355 (2012) (recognizing localities’
ability to tailor laws to local conditions, innovate, and serve as useful partners in specific
ventures).
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fracking entirely is likely to be preempted,62 local regulation is typically limited to secondary issues such as siting, aesthetics, noise levels,
and hours of operation.63 Although state level regulations have the
ability to create a more stable, predictable, and uniform regulatory
scheme with the advantage of better-funded enforcement mechanisms,64 there is noticeable discord between state and local governments in terms of regulation.65
b. Preemption
Basic principles of federalism, delegating power horizontally
across branches of government and vertically to more local levels, are
equally applicable at the state government level.66 Despite a municipality’s broad police power to protect “the health, safety, and welfare
of the community,” municipalities are ultimately state creations, having only as much authority as the state elects to provide constitutionally or by statute.67 States can preempt local control over fracking
regulation through express, conflict, or field preemption.68 States can
exert differing levels of control over local ability to regulate depending on the scope of legislation enacted and type of preemption employed. Colorado courts, for example, would analyze each local
regulation individually to determine whether or not it, in fact, conflicts with state law, while such an inquiry is unnecessary in a state like
West Virginia, which has occupied the field of oil and gas development completely.69
Although preemption carries with it the possibility of creating a
baseline of protection—preventing a “‘race to the bottom’”70—the
disparate approaches and potentially inflammatory political nature of
regulation has sparked legal challenges and created an uncertain legal
62. See infra Part I.B.2.ii.
63. Armstrong, supra note 58, at 364–65.
64. Kitze, supra note 12, at 393–94.
65. Id. at 395.
66. Armstrong, supra note 58, at 370.
67. Kitze, supra note 12, at 392.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 396; compare Town of Frederick v. N. Am. Res. Co., 60 P.3d 758, 765 (Colo.
App. 2002) (holding that state law did not preempt the entirety of a municipal oil and gas
drilling ordinance, but that the ordinance’s setback, noise abatement, and visual impact
provisions were preempted), with Ne. Natural Energy, LLC v. City of Morgantown, No. 11C-411, 2011 WL 3584376, at *9 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 12, 2011) (holding that the W. VA.
CODE § 22-6, et seq. (1994) gives exclusive control of the area of oil and gas development to
the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection).
70. Kitze, supra note 12, at 394.
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framework.71 Local ordinances are the most intimate manifestation of
democracy at work. The continuing battles over state versus local authority to regulate fracking are indicative of a persistent dissatisfaction
with state-centered regulatory schemes.72 As one scholar has noted,
“Preemption inhibits the ability of local communities to create and
fulfill their own unique visions of how they will live.”73 The fracking
debate transcends politics, economics, and doctrinal interpretation—
implicating rights “inherent to mankind.”74

II.

The Public Trust Doctrine

The concept of the public trust was first codified in the sixth century when Emperor Justinian wrote, “[T]he following things are by
natural law common [property for] all—the air, running water, the
sea, and consequently the sea-shore.”75 English common law developed to embrace this principle by obligating the Crown to protect
lands and resources for the benefit of all its subjects.76
In 1821, the doctrine came to America. In Arnold v. Mundy,77 the
Supreme Court of New Jersey recognized “by the law of nature, which
is the only true foundation of all the social rights,” the waters and the
land under the water were common property and were to be held by
the sovereign “in trust for all the citizens.”78 The United States Supreme Court appeared to endorse the doctrine, although certainly
not explicitly, in its 1892 decision in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, finding the state could not grant to the railroad lakefront property for development because the public retained a trust interest in
the property.79 Despite the Court’s vagueness, Illinois Central became
71. Compare Norse Energy Corp. USA v. Town of Dryden, 964 N.Y.S.2d 714 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2013) (upholding ban on fracking under local zoning power), leave to appeal granted
972 N.Y.S.2d 535 (N.Y. 2013), with Range Res.-Appalachia, LLC v. Salem Twp., 964 A.2d
869, 874 (Pa. 2009) (striking down local ordinance that attempted to regulate fracking
procedures).
72. Kitze, supra note 12, at 412.
73. Id. at 395 (citing Jerrold A. Long, Sustainability Starts Locally: Untying the Hands of
Local Governments to Create Sustainable Communities, 10 WYO. L. REV. 1, 33–34 (2010)).
74. Robinson Twp. v. Pennsylvania, 83 A.3d 901, 948 n.36 (Pa. 2013) (quoting Driscoll
v. Corbett, 69 A.3d 197, 208 (Pa. 2013)).
75. J. INST. 2.1.1.
76. Harry R. Bader, Antaeus and the Public Trust Doctrine: A New Approach to Substantive
Environmental Protection in the Common Law, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 749, 751 (1992).
77. 6 N.J.L. 1 (N.J. 1821).
78. Id. at 11–12, 42.
79. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 462 (1892).
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the basis for numerous decisions employing the public trust doctrine
primarily to protect public access to waterways.80
A. Sax Revival
After World War II, the doctrine fell into relative disuse as a legal
tool until 1970 when law professor Joseph Sax precipitated its modern
revival in his article The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law:
Effective Judicial Intervention.81 Sax conceived the doctrine to be a “useful tool of general application for citizens seeking to develop a comprehensive legal approach to resource management problems.”82 Sax
portrays the doctrine as primarily a judicial tool, allowing courts to
“mend perceived imperfections in the legislative and administrative
process.”83 Explicitly, he characterizes the concept of the public trust
as “a medium for democratization.”84 Although Sax might have envisioned the doctrine as a delicate balance of procedural and substantive protections, he nonetheless outlined a doctrine that affords
citizens a powerful tool—a legal right the public can enforce against
the government in the interest of advancing contemporary environmental concerns.85
The public trust doctrine is based upon the fundamental understanding that some natural resources are essential to the continuing
well-being of communities. The doctrine aims to protect resources
“not because it is either an ethical thing to do or a positive amenity,
but because these resources are absolutely essential for human physical, spiritual, and economic well-being.”86 By placing the state under a
fiduciary obligation to protect trust resources and prevent private appropriation, the doctrine aims to limit the impact of reckless, economically driven conduct that has the potential to “jeopardize our very
existence.”87 The doctrine does not stifle development or prevent
change, but rather guards against potentially destabilizing changes
80. See William D. Araiza, Democracy, Distrust, and the Public Trust: Process-Based Constitutional Theory, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Search for a Substantive Environmental Value, 45
UCLA L. REV. 385, 396–97 (1997); see, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. State, 214 N.W. 820 (Wis.
1927); In re Crawford County Levee & Drainage Dist. No. 1, 196 N.W. 874 (Wis. 1924);
Adams v. Elliott, 174 So. 731 (Fla. 1937).
81. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
82. Id. at 474.
83. Id. at 509.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 556–57.
86. Bader, supra note 76, at 755.
87. Id.
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that threaten the expectations, resources, and well-being of future
generations.88 The public trust doctrine promotes sustainable development—evolutionary, not revolutionary, change.
Courts have begun to provide context and foundation for the
modern public trust doctrine in the decades following Sax’s articulation.89 Among the most important was Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior
Court (the Mono Lake Case), in which the California Supreme Court
broadened the scope of the public trust to include not just flowing
waters, but also inland bodies of water and water rights.90 Courts have
also considered, often with differing results, whether the public trust
extends to public access,91 water rights,92 water quality,93 fish and wildlife resources,94 and air resources.95
B. International Endorsement
Although the foregoing cases are noteworthy and innovative in
their own right, expansion of the public trust doctrine internationally
has far outpaced development in the United States. Nearly every national constitution adopted or amended since 1972 has included a
constitutional right to a decent environment.96 A number of countries
have explicitly enshrined the trust principles in national constitutions,
affording their citizens substantive protections of natural resources. At
least ten nations have an established body of public trust law: India,
Pakistan, the Philippines, Uganda, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Brazil, Ecuador, and Canada.97 International approaches to environmental conservation and human protection from environmental
88. Michael C. Blumm & Rachel D. Guthrie, Internationalizing the Public Trust Doctrine:
Natural Law and Constitutional and Statutory Approaches to Fulfilling the Saxion Vision, 45 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 741, 754 (2012).
89. See, e.g., State v. Superior Court (Lyon), 625 P.2d 239, 244–46 (Cal. 1981) (concerning Clear Lake); State v. Superior Court (Fogerty), 625 P.2d 256, 259–60 (Cal. 1981)
(concerning Lake Tahoe).
90. 658 P.2d 709, 732 (Cal. 1983).
91. Richard M. Frank, The Public Trust Doctrine: Assessing Its Recent Past & Charting Its
Future, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 665, 674 (2012). See, e.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement
Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 358 (N.J. 1984) (finding public trust easement to cross private land to
access ocean).
92. Frank, supra note 91, at 675. See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d 709.
93. Frank, supra note 91, at 677.
94. Id. at 677–78.
95. Id. at 679–80.
96. Dinah Shelton, Challenges to the Future of Civil and Political Rights, 55 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 669, 682 (1998).
97. Blumm & Guthrie, supra note 88, at 745.
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exploitation are more explicit and expansive.98 A few examples are
illustrative.
The Supreme Court of India first recognized the public trust in a
1996 opinion that rooted the doctrine in common law and cited both
Illinois Central Railroad and Professor Sax’s article.99 Three years later,
the court located the doctrine in the right to life language of the national constitution and suggested the doctrine’s natural law origins
protected it from political reversal.100 The doctrine extends to protect
all natural resources and aims to ensure intergenerational equity.101
Pakistan’s Supreme Court has also implicitly recognized the doctrine
by explicitly holding that their country’s constitutional guarantee of
life includes environmental health.102 Although case law is sparse, it is
clear that the government of Pakistan has a duty to protect water resources, and it appears that duty extends to all natural resources.103
The Supreme Court of the Philippines recognized the doctrine in
a 1987 constitutional amendment requiring the state to “protect and
advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature,” as well as inherent in
natural law principles of self-preservation and self-perpetuation.104
The doctrine is expansive, extending to the management, conservation, and equitable distribution of all natural resources.105 Both the
Ugandan and Kenyan Supreme Courts have found constitutional and
statutory bases for the doctrine and recognized that the protections
serve traditional functions, as well as unique moral, cultural, spiritual,
and medicinal purposes.106
The most apparent effect of the public trust’s recognition abroad
is a relatively small, yet continually expanding body of environmental
law. In the long-run, the public trust has the potential to positively
impact the international community in ways beyond simply protecting
natural resources. From a sociological point of view, continued expansion and increased support for the public trust raises hopes for a more
united international community. The presence of an environmental
98. Id. at 746.
99. M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath (1997) 1 S.C.C. 388 (India), 17–18, available at http://
www.ielrc.org/content/e9615.pdf.
100. Blumm & Guthrie, supra note 88, at 762–63.
101. Id. at 763–65.
102. Id. at 766.
103. Id. at 769.
104. Id. at 771–74.
105. Id. at 774–75.
106. Id. at 777–85.
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global order, secured at least in part with the creation of soft law
through legal precedent, theoretically reduces the likelihood of a single rogue state prioritizing the interests of itself over the greater community.107 That type of pressure will have the primary effect of
reducing the existence of environmentally harmful policies and also a
secondary effect of altering the political structure that implemented
it. The rise of a powerful international public trust community has the
potential to force systemic, and sustainability-driven change in countries currently dominated by market-driven neoliberal ideology.108 As
one scholar eloquently surmised, “[T]he Public Trust Doctrine’s
reach seems constrained only by the imagination of those who would
protect both the natural world and the public’s right to the sustainable use of that world.”109 With the resurgence of the public trust still
in its infancy, the ultimate extent of that reach remains boundless.
From a rights-based perspective, the link between environmental
degradation and internationally guaranteed human rights cannot be
discounted.110 Environmental challenges under the public trust doctrine will inevitably invite discourse around rights to life, health, clean
water, clean air, and of course a healthy environment. An emphasis on
these rights, and an opportunity for participation from the communities most affected, increases pressure on violating governments.111
This emphasis offers hope for better environmental decision making
and a more robust body of recognized basic human rights.112 While
global environmental human rights have not yet attained the inviolate
status enjoyed by the rights implicit in the public trust doctrine, some
believe it inevitable.113 Although the United Nations Human Rights
Commission’s 1994 Draft Principles on Human Rights and the Environment remain unratified, a 2005 report to the Commission documented the “‘repeated and increasing recognition of a human-rights
107. Sheila Jasanoff, A World of Experts: Science and Global Environmental Constitutionalism,
40 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 439, 440 (2013).
108. Blake Hudson, Global Environmental Constitutionalism Symposium at Widener Law, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PROF BLOG (Apr. 11, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/environ
mental_law/2014/04/global-environmental-constitutionalism-symposium-at-widener-law
.html.
109. David Takacs, The Public Trust Doctrine, Environmental Human Rights, and the Future
of Private Property, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 711, 718 (2008).
110. Dinah Shelton, Human Rights, Health & Environmental Protection: Linkages in Law &
Practice 24 (World Health Org., Health & Human Rights Working Paper Series No. 1,
2002).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Takacs, supra note 109, at 725.
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based approach to environmental protection.’”114 Currently, nearly
all regional and global human rights’ bodies identify links between
environmental degradation and internationally protected human
rights, and more than one hundred nations guarantee resource protection and a right to a healthy environment.115
Whether rooted in constitutional precedent, statute, fundamental rights, natural law, or international norms, the message is consistent. That message epitomizes “the longstanding idea that some parts
of the natural world are gifts of nature so essential to human life that
private interests cannot usurp them, and so the sovereign must steward them to prevent such capture.”116

III.

Robinson Township. v. Commonwealth

No language in the United States Constitution has yet been interpreted to include public trust principles. Some state constitutions do
contemplate natural resources or environmental protection. Three
states—Hawaii,117 Illinois,118 and Massachusetts119—provide environmental protection in constitutional amendments that direct legislative
action and prescribe public policy. Pennsylvania,120 Montana,121 and
Rhode Island122 are the only states to enshrine individual environmental rights alongside political rights in a constitutional fashion.123
Citizens recently exercised those rights in the fracking context in what
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court deemed an unprecedented challenge to vindicate fundamental constitutional rights.124
114. Id. at 725–26; see also MARCELLO MOLLO ET AL., EARTHJUSTICE, ENVIRONMENTAL
RIGHTS REPORT 1 (2005), available at http://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/library/
references/2005_ENVIRONMENTAL_RIGHTS_REPORTrev.pdf.
115. Takacs, supra note 109, at 726.
116. Id. at 718.
117. HAW. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1, 9.
118. ILL. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1, 2.
119. MASS. CONST. amend. XCVII.
120. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
121. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“All persons are born free and have certain inalienable
rights. They include the right to a clean and healthful environment . . . .”).
122. R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17 (“[I]t shall be the duty of the general assembly to provide
for the conservation of the air, land, water, plant, animal, mineral and other natural resources of the state, and to adopt all means necessary and proper by law to protect the
natural environment of the people . . . .”).
123. Robinson Twp. v. Pennsylvania, 83 A.3d 901, 962 (Pa. 2013).
124. Id. at 976.
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A. Act 13
Act 13 of 2012,125 amending the Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act,126
comprised of sweeping legislation affecting Pennsylvania’s environment and the exploitation and recovery of natural gas in the
Marcellus Shale. The Commonwealth viewed Act 13 as a comprehensive reform of oil and gas laws, driven by policy determinations to promote development of vast natural gas reserves, encouraging energy
self-sufficiency, and ensuring uniformity of local zoning ordinances
throughout the state.127 The citizens, on other hand, characterized
Act 13 as a blunt one-size-fits-all accommodation of the oil and gas
industry that worked a remarkable revolution on zoning that would
change the character of existing neighborhoods and affect planning
for future growth.128 Four provisions of Act 13, §§ 3303, 3304,
3215(b), 3215(d), comprised the heart of the constitutional
challenge.
Section 3303 professed environmental acts to be of statewide concern and stated the legislature’s intent to occupy the entire field of oil
and gas regulation by preempting and superseding all local regulation
of oil and gas operations.129 Section 3304 instituted uniformity among
local ordinances, by obligating some local action and precluding
other action, in order to allow reasonable development of oil and gas
resources.130 Local governments were, for example, required to authorize oil and gas operations as a permitted use in all zoning districts,
while being prohibited from limiting hours of operation for oil and
gas industry operations.131 Section 3304 effectively reduced local zoning power to “pro forma” acceptance of the General Assembly’s industry accommodation.132
Section 3215(b) imposed modest well setback requirements133
near wetlands and bodies of water, but then provided a waiver to those
restrictions simply upon submission of a plan identifying additional
125. H.B. 1950, 196th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2012).
126. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2301–3504 (2012).
127. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 933.
128. Id. at 936–38.
129. Id. at 970.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 970–71.
132. Id. at 972.
133. Id. at 972–73. Section 3215(b)(2) provided that “[t]he edge of the disturbed area
associated with any unconventional well site must maintain a 100-foot setback from the
edge of any solid blue lined stream, spring or body of water as identified on the most
current 71/2 minute topographic quadrangle map of the United States Geological Survey.”
Id.
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safety measures.134 Remarkably, Act 13 placed the burden on the
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) to
prove “that the [setback] conditions were necessary to protect against a
probable harmful impact of the public resources.”135 Section 3215(d)
created a system by which municipalities could submit written, nonbinding comments detailing local conditions and circumstances that
the DEP should consider in making determinations. Section 3215(d)
went on to provide that DEP determinations were final and
unappealable.136
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania agreed Act 13 worked a remarkable revolution upon Pennsylvania’s existing zoning regimen.137
The court’s constitutional analysis, too, is remarkable.
B. Basis of Decision
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, relying on the Pennsylvania
Constitution, legislative history, natural law principles, and environmental and economic realities, spoke unequivocally in favor of sustainable development. The court found unconstitutional §§ 3303,
3304, and 3215 as impermissible encroachments of the inherent and
indefeasible guarantees in the Environmental Rights Amendment of
the Pennsylvania Constitution.138
Article I, section 27 of the Declaration of Rights in the Pennsylvania Constitution,139 the Environmental Rights Amendment, identifies protected rights, prevents the state from acting in certain ways,
and establishes a framework for the state to participate affirmatively in
the development and enforcement of these rights.140
The first clause grants citizens an affirmative “right to clean air,
pure water, and to the preservation of natural, scenic, historic, and
134. Id. at 973. Section 3215(b)(4) provided that “[t]he Department shall waive the
distance restrictions upon submission of a plan identifying additional measures, facilities
or practices to be employed during well site construction, drilling and operations necessary
to protect the waters of this Commonwealth.” Id.
135. Id. (emphasis added).
136. Id. at 973–74.
137. Id. at 971.
138. Id. at 978–85.
139. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (“The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to
the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment.
Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the common property of all the people, including generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.”).
140. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 950.
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esthetic values.”141 The rights guaranteed in Article I of the Declaration of Rights, including the Environmental Rights Amendment, “are
inherent in man’s nature and preserved rather than created by the
Pennsylvania Constitution,”142 meaning regulation must be
subordinate to enjoyment of the right.143 Notably, the court recognized that the “inviolate” nature of these rights implies that economic
development cannot take place at the expense of unreasonable environmental destruction—thus requiring the state to promote sustainable economic development.144
The second and third clauses embody the public trust doctrine.
The second clause establishes common ownership of resources, without explicitly defining the scope of that ownership.145 The court identified the current conception of public natural resources to include
state-owned lands, waterways, mineral reserves, ambient air, surface
and groundwater, and wild flora and fauna, while also acknowledging
that the term is adaptable to conform to societal concerns.146 The
third clause establishes the State’s duties with respect to these natural
resources.147 As trustee, the State is a fiduciary obligated to act toward
the corpus of the trust—the public natural resources—with prudence,
loyalty, and impartiality.148 To meet its fiduciary duty, the State must
prohibit activity, whether direct or indirect, that threatens to degrade,
diminish, or deplete resources, as well as act affirmatively to protect
the environment through legislative action.149 Moreover, the State
must execute these duties with the interest of the beneficiaries—all
Pennsylvanians, including future generations—in mind.150 That obligation requires a holistic balancing that considers the potential longterm consequences.151 The court summarized that the express duties
to conserve and maintain can be “tempered by legitimate develop141. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
142. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 948.
143. Id. at 951.
144. Id. at 954.
145. PA. CONST. art I, § 27 (“Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the common
property of all the people, including generations yet to come.”).
146. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 955.
147. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (“As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall
conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.”).
148. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 957.
149. Id. at 957–58.
150. Id. at 958–59.
151. Id. at 959 (“Dealing impartially with all beneficiaries means that the trustee must
treat all equitably in light of the purposes of the trust.”).
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ment tending to improve upon the lot of Pennsylvania’s citizenry, with
the evident goal of promoting sustainable development.”152
C. Practical Outcome
Relying on section 27 and the public trust doctrine, the court
struck down §§ 3303, 3304, and 3215 as unconstitutional, recognizing
that the natural gas industry “has and will have a lasting, and undeniably detrimental” effect on resources essential to life, health, and
liberty.153
Section 3303, which purported to preempt the regulatory oil and
gas field to the exclusion of all local legislation, impermissibly commanded municipalities to ignore obligations to conserve and maintain
natural resources under section 27.154 Recognizing separation of powers principles, and echoing the intimate nature of local government,155 the court reasoned that Act 13 ordered localities to
accommodate new and invasive practices, fundamentally disrupting
local citizens’ environmental expectations.156 Act 13 unequivocally
“command[ed] municipalities to ignore their obligations under Article I, section 27 and further direct[ed] municipalities to take affirmative actions to undo existing protections.”157
Section 3304, which made industrial uses a matter of right in all
zoning districts and prevented even modest locally tailored protections, failed to prevent degradation, diminution, and depletion of
public natural resources. These drastic changes to existing zoning
schemes “alter[ed] existing expectations of communities and property owners and substantially diminish[ed] natural and esthetic values
of the local environment.”158 The Act’s “blunt approach,” disregarding the disparate effects that differently situated communities would
endure, failed to manage the trust for the benefit of all people.159
Despite the undoubted urgency with which the political branches
must move to secure the economic benefits of natural gas development, that urgency cannot be permitted to supersede constitutional
demands.160 The trustee’s actions must be measured by benefits “be152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 958.
Id. at 975.
Id. at 978.
See supra Part I.B.2.i.
Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 977.
Id. at 978.
Id. at 979.
Id. at 980.
Id. at 981–82.
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stowed upon all citizens in their utilization of natural resources,”
rather than by “the balance sheet profits and appreciation realized
from resource operations.”161 In an unabashed call for sustainable development, the court recalled section 27’s legislative history, recounting that “‘the measure of our progress is not just what we have but
how we live . . . .’”162
Section 3215, which created a seemingly universal waiver to well
setback provisions, failed to establish meaningful substantive standards by which to conserve and maintain environmental resources.
Without legislative guidance on the meaning of the term “necessary,”
the court appraised the setback waiver provision of § 3215(b) as an
invitation for “arbitrary [government] decision-making with a disparate impact on trust beneficiaries.”163 Subsection (d), moreover,
marginalized participation by residents, business owners, and elected
representatives with the creation of a permit scheme that did not
guarantee consideration of local concerns or provide an appeal process.164 Ultimately, the court found that the statutory scheme “dilutes
the Department’s authority to regulate and enforce adequate environmental standards, and fosters departures from the goal of sustainable
development.”165

IV.

Moving Forward

It would be difficult to conceive of a more sweeping endorsement
of the concept of the public trust than Robinson. The court suggested
Pennsylvania’s unique industrial past to be the necessary prologue to
Robinson.166 Ostensibly, that might hold true. Pennsylvania has been
pivotal in the rise and fall of U.S. industrialism—first oil, then steel,
and now rust. Natural gas today, like oil and steel of yesterday,
promises economic prosperity at the expense of environmental degradation. Robinson, and its welcomed recognition of the need to balance
economic self-determination with environmental self-preservation,
161. Id. at 978.
162. Id. (quoting COMMONWEALTH OF PA. LEGIS. JOURNAL, GEN. ASSEMB. 154-118, 1970
Sess., at 2270 (1970)).
163. Id. at 984.
164. Id. at 984, 932 n.19.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 976. The court described Pennsylvania’s cultivation of coal, oil, and steel to
retrospectively be “a shortsighted exploitation of its bounteous environment, affecting its
minerals, its water, its air, its flora and fauna, and its people,” and suggested section 27’s
rights and duties are a unique attempt to restore Pennsylvania’s pure beauty that William
Penn first witnessed upon his arrival in the seventeenth century. Id.
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however, ought not be limited to its facts or to Pennsylvania’s circumstance. Pennsylvania’s “shortsighted exploitation of its bounteous environment”167 is not sui generis, but a prevailing global practice that
calls for urgent attention.168 Air pollution, water pollution, and hydrocarbons are global risks.169 Former Pennsylvania governor and first
director of the United States Forest Service, Gifford Pinchot, believed
that the “very existence of our nation, and of all the rest, depends on
conserving the resources which are the foundations of its life.”170 Sustainable development is more necessary now than ever.171
A. Endorsement and Example for the International Community
Recent incorporation of the public trust doctrine into national
constitutions abroad has the potential to bring disparate segments of
the international community to the forefront of the global environmental debate. Although gaps both in terms of coverage and participation in environmental treaties continue to make meaningful
international environmental standards a fantasy,172 a global consensus
continues to emerge.173 Environment and economy are quickly accel167. Id.
168. Nidaa Bakhsh & Brian Swint, Fracking Spreads Worldwide, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS
(Nov. 14, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-11-14/2014-outlook-shalefracking-goes-global (speculating that a record number of shale wells may be drilled internationally in 2014).
169. See Climate Change, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/globalissues/climate
change (last visited May 4, 2014) (arguing that the increase in greenhouse gases—exacerbated by the burning of fossil fuels—leads to irreversible ecosystem changes, threatening
environments as diverse as the Amazon rainforest and the Arctic tundra); Climate Change
Impacts, ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, http://www.edf.org/climate/climate-changeimpacts (last visited May 4, 2014) (explaining that rising global temperatures threaten to
reduce arctic glaciers, raise sea levels, increase flooding and droughts, spark devastating
heat waves, and diminish air quality).
170. John C. Dernbach, Taking the Pennsylvania Constitution Seriously When It Protects the
Environment: Part I—An Interpretative Framework for Article I, Section 27, 103 DICK. L. REV. 693,
716–17 (1999).
171. See Jeffrey D. Sachs, Jeffrey Sachs: The Necessity for Sustainable Development, S.F. BAY
GUARDIAN ONLINE (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.sfbg.com/bruce/2012/01/31/jeffrey-sachsnecessity-sustainable-development (suggesting that because the global population is expected to exceed nine billion by 2050, practices that limit CO2 emissions are necessary to
prevent irreversible environmental effects, understand our fate, and embrace sustainable
development).
172. GLOBAL PROJECT FINANCE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 70–71
(Sheldon Leader & David Ong eds., 2011).
173. See The Need for a New Global Agreement on Climate Change, UNITED NATIONS, http://
www.un.org/wcm/content/site/climatechange/pages/gateway/the-negotiations/theneed-for-a-new-global-agreement (last visited May 4, 2014) (recognizing that with stronger
scientific evidence about the effects of climate change, there is a growing sense of urgency
for stronger international action, and calling for new agreements that address the needs of

382

UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

erating into a seamless web of local, regional, national, and global
cause and effect.174 Healthy, responsible economic growth in developing countries is stifled by protectionism, intolerable debt burdens, unreliable development finance, and disdain from the developed world,
the United States, and the West.175
For the international community, the implications of Robinson’s
holding—requiring dedication to evolutionary, not revolutionary, sustainable development—should not be understated. In a remarkable
shift away from historical Western hegemony, Robinson recognized
that “it is not man who must adapt himself to technology but technology which must be adapted to man.”176 Nobel Prize-winning author
Gabriel Garcia Marquez remarked that for much of the developing
world, the “crucial problem has been a lack of conventional means to
render our lives believable.”177 Although there is much work to be
done, Robinson should be seen as an endorsement of the emerging
international approach to sustainable development and as a sign of
hope for a global consensus. The public trust doctrine has the potential to establish a conventional environmental protection mechanism
with the flexibility for unique application, and the legitimacy to cultivate Marquez’s believability. The courts, as the gatekeepers of the government’s fiduciary duties, shall lay the foundation, case by case, for a
global public trust.
B. A Call to Action at Home
The message from the international community and Robinson undeniably promises that the public trust can provide a remedy for environmental wrongs. “Environmental amendments to state or national
constitutions are attractive, however, only if they can be applied in a
meaningful way.”178 Robinson, which provides both a thorough constitutional interpretation of the theoretical groundings and a practical
developing countries while safeguarding the economic interest of industrialized
countries).
174. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT & DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE,
FROM ONE EARTH TO ONE WORLD I.2.15 (1987), available at http://www.un-documents
.net/ocf-ov.htm#1.2.
175. Id. at I.2.17–18.
176. Robinson Twp. v. Pennsylvania, 83 A.3d 901, 954 (Pa. 2013).
177. Gabriel Garcı́a Márquez, Nobel Lecture: The Solitude of Latin America (Dec. 8,
1982), available at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/1982/
marquez-lecture.html.
178. Dernbach, supra note 170, at 698.
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application of the substantive doctrine, creates a legal framework for
proliferation of public trust principles.
The most obvious and powerful large-scale implementation of the
public trust doctrine, either procedurally or substantively, would come
through incorporation in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Given the United States Supreme Court’s current composition and contemporary due process jurisprudence, however,
neither the creation of a new fundamental right nor a broadening of
life or liberty language seems a practical possibility for extending substantive environmental rights.179 Joseph Sax, however, recognizing the
inherently political nature of the substantive aspect of the public trust,
suggested a more subtle, yet profound procedural role for the
courts.180
Undoubtedly, the judiciary can accurately be described as an institutional medium aimed at promoting intelligent public policy.181
Courts, although operating with tremendous freedom in passing upon
the wisdom of those policies, are “too sophisticated and restrained” to
nakedly announce a policy illegal because it is unwise; rather, they
more regularly stall such policies either by requiring additional administrative justification, or by returning the issue to the political
sphere.182 Insulated from, but keenly aware of, the role of
majoritarian politics, the courts are more akin to the gatekeeper than
“the ultimate guardian of the public weal.”183 Courts aim to achieve
democratization—typically either by requiring intervention to represent the underrepresented, or by requiring the legislature to make
a transparent policy decision.184 Even the most activist and interventionist courts, rather than looking to usurp legislative power, look to
“thrust[ ] decision making upon a truly representative body.”185 Incorporation of the public trust doctrine as an aspect of procedural due
process will give citizens the chance to retain a material role in local
179. See United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 39 (1994) (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring) (categorizing the concept of “substantive due process” as an oxymoron rather than a
constitutional right).
180. Sax, supra note 81, at 558 (“It should be obvious that courts operate with an extraordinary degree of freedom and that the procedural devices they employ are very significantly determined by their attitudes about the propriety of the policies which are before
them.”).
181. Id. at 557–58.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 559.
184. Id. at 558.
185. Id. at 559.
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environmental decision making,186 and allow courts to achieve their
democratizing goals.
Judicial enforcement of the public trust is the most efficacious
starting point, not only because of its legitimizing insulation from
electoral politics, but also because that action pays tribute to the Founders’ most profound vision for democratic courts. James Madison reflected that “[i]n framing a government which is to be administered
by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable
the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige
it to control itself.”187 Judicial oversight is as necessary in the enforcement of public resource trusts as it is in private trusts.188 Just as private
trustees are judicially accountable to their beneficiaries, so too are the
legislative and executive branches of government accountable to the
beneficiaries of the public trust.189
Evoking the spirit of Marbury v. Madison,190 the court in Robinson
recognized that, while separation of powers principles are incumbent
upon all branches of government, “our finding that this particular legislation crosses this constitutional line is not a substitution of our own
preferences for those of the General Assembly.”191 To the contrary,
“the notion that judicial decisions passing upon such challenges represent ‘judicial legislation’—unless the legislative act is rubberstamped—misconceives our own duty.”192 That solemn duty, in the
public trust context, is the balancing of the preservation of rights and
sovereign powers of future generations—the quintessential unrepresented minority—with the careless materiality of the current political
majority.193
186. Because preemption threatens meaningful individual participation in local governance, the incorporation of the public trust doctrine may be one route to keep these
decisions local. See supra Part I.B.2.ii.
187. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 294 (James Madison).
188. Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants Seeking Reversal,
Sanders-Reed ex rel. Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, No. 33,110, 2015 WL 1120403, at *22 (N.M.
Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2014) [hereinafter Brief of Law Professors], available at http://ourchil
drenstrust.org/sites/default/files/NMLawProfAmicus.pdf (relying in large part upon
Robinson in encouraging New Mexico to invoke the protections of the public trust
doctrine).
189. Id. at *11–12 (quoting Ariz. Ctr. for Law in Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158,
169 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991)).
190. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
191. Robinson Twp. v. Pennsylvania, 83 A.3d 901, 985 n.62 (Pa. 2013).
192. Id.
193. Brief of Law Professors, supra note 188, at 20–21.
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Although federal treatment would set a clear priority for environmental concerns,194 the political landscape makes that an unlikely reality.195 Constitutional changes at the state level, however, are more
practical and, without the national political flare, have the potential to
create a more significant impact. More than two-thirds of state constitutions, and every one written since 1959, contain provisions concerning protection and preservation of natural resources and the
environment.196 At the state level, it is possible to garner the political
support necessary to create a right to a healthy environment that is
considered on par with, and enforceable to the same extent as, other
political rights. It is possible to recognize, and for courts to enforce,
environmental rights as among the group of select rights “inherent to
mankind, and thus secured rather than bestowed by the Constitution.”197 Ultimately, it must be the task of curious law students, dedicated professors, and seasoned practitioners to produce provocative
legal scholarship that fuels debate, urges public outcry, and forces political and judicial action.198
194. See Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (requesting
review of a claim, which had originally been dismissed on the grounds that the public trust
doctrine is a matter of state law only, seeking to obligate the federal government to develop and implement a comprehensive climate recovery plan).
195. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia explained that the case “is
about the fundamental nature of our government and our constitutional system,” and dismissed the case, reasoning that “a sweeping court-imposed remedy is [not] the appropriate
medicine for every intractable problem.” Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11, 17 (D.D.C.
2012). The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed, per curiam, without a published
opinion. Alec L., 561 F. App’x 7. Despite submission of dozens of amicus briefs representing interests ranging from economics, national security, government, faith, human rights,
and business, one commentator succinctly exposed the greater forces at play. He
presciently opined it “difficult to imagine [the U.S. Supreme Court] taking up this public
trust doctrine case” after having fashioned the Citizens United framework giving corporations emitting greenhouse gases the ability to spend unlimited sums of political money to
preserve their right to the status quo. Jeff Nesbit, Who Speaks for the Earth?, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Nov. 10, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/at-the-edge/2014/11/
10/who-speaks-for-the-earth.
Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court denied the petition on December 8, 2014, without
comment. Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 135 S. Ct. 774 (2014).
196. Dernbach, supra note 170, at 698.
197. Robinson Twp. v. Pennsylvania, 83 A.3d 901, 948 n.36 (Pa. 2013) (quoting Driscoll
v. Corbett, 69 A.3d 197, 208 (Pa. 2013)).
198. See, e.g., Dernbach, supra note 170; John C. Dernbach, Taking the Pennsylvania Constitution Seriously When it Protects the Environment: Part II—Environmental Rights and Public
Trust, 104 DICK. L. REV. 97 (1999). Professor Dernbach’s articles were foundational to the
reasoning in Robinson. 83 A.3d at 953, 954 (citing both of Dernbach’s articles). He continues his push for greater environmental protection, presenting webinars exploring the implications of, and avenues for, expanding Robinson, and most recently participating in a
symposium at Widener University with scholars from around the globe, titled Global Envi-
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Conclusion
Professor Sax passed away on March 9, 2014.199 He recently remarked, “[I]f you’re going to work on issues like environmental protection, you have to be opportunistic in the sense that you wait until
the time is ripe, and then you can get some things done.”200 Fracking
and its attendant risks are real.201 The obligations Pennsylvania assumes are noble, and the rights it guarantees are novel. Robinson’s remarkable and courageous application of the public trust doctrine
stands as a testament abroad and a revelation at home. The upshot is
achievement of a quintessential American ideal, perhaps most profoundly professed by troubadour trustee Woody Guthrie—“Nobody
living can ever stop me, [a]s I go walking that freedom highway;
[n]obody living can ever make me turn back. This land was made for
you and me.”202 After Robinson, it might finally be that this land belongs to you and me.

ronmental Constitutionalism. See Global Environmental Constitutionalism Symposium at Widener
Law, ENVTL. LAW PROF BLOG (Apr. 11, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/environmental_law/2014/04/global-environmental-constitutionalism-symposium-at-widener-law
.html.
199. Douglas Martin, Joseph Sax, Who Pioneered Environmental Law, Dies at 78, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/11/us/joseph-l-sax-who-pioneered-legal-protections-for-natural-resources-dies-at-78.html.
200. Id.
201. See supra Part I.A.
202. This Land Is Your Land, OFFICIAL WOODY GUTHRIE WEBSITE, http://www.woody
guthrie.org/Lyrics/This_Land.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2015) (Woody Guthrie Publications, Inc. & TRO-Ludlow Music, Inc. 1956).

